






















CHARACTERIZING COMPROMISE STABILITY OF GAMES 
USING LARGINAL VECTORS 
  























ISSN 0924-7815 Characterizing compromise stability of games using
larginal vectors
Trine Torne Platz1 Herbert Hamers2 Marieke Quant2
Abstract
The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex
hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal vector corresponds to an order of the players
and describes the ecient payo vector giving the rst players in the order their
utopia demand as long as it is still possible to assign the remaining players at
least their minimum right. A game is called compromise stable if the core is equal
to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In this
paper we describe two ways of characterizing sets of larginal vectors that satisfy
the condition that if every larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the
game is compromise stable. The rst characterization of these sets is based on a
neighbor argument on orders of the players. The second one uses combinatorial
and matching arguments and leads to a complete characterization of these sets.
We nd characterizing sets of minimum cardinality, a closed formula for the
minimum number of orders in these sets, and a partition of the set of all orders
in which each element of the partition is a minimum characterizing set.
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11 Introduction
The core, introduced by Gillies (1953), is a well-established solution concept for TU-
games and equals the set of ecient allocations that satisfy the property that no
subcoalition has an incentive to leave the grand coalition and act on their own. The
Weber set (Weber (1988)) and the core cover (Tijs and Lipperts (1982)) are well-known
supersets of the core.
The Weber set is the convex hull of the marginal vectors. A marginal vector corre-
sponds to an order of the players and is the ecient allocation vector that assigns to
every player his marginal contribution to the coalition consisting of players preceding
him in the order. Shapley (1971) and Ichiisi (1981) showed that a TU-game is convex
if and only if the core is equal to the Weber set, i.e., if the core is the convex hull of
the marginal vectors.
A set of marginal vectors characterizes convexity if it satises the condition that
a game is convex whenever all marginal vectors of this set are core elements. Rafels
and Ybern (1995) showed that the set consisting of either all even or all odd marginal
vectors are sets that characterize convexity. Van Velzen et al. (2002) improved this
result by nding such characterizing sets with a smaller cardinality by using a neighbor
argument showing that if two consecutive neighbors of a marginal vector are in the core,
so is the marginal vector itself. Using combinatorial arguments Van Velzen et al. (2004)
derive the minimum cardinality of sets that characterize convexity.
Quant et al. (2005) showed that the core cover equals the convex hull of the
larginal vectors. A larginal vector corresponds to an ordering of the players and equals
the ecient payo vector giving the rst players in the order their utopia demand as
long as it is still possible to assign the remaining players at least their minimum right.
A TU-game is compromise stable if and only if the core cover equals the core, i.e., if
the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. The interest in compromise stable
games is two-fold. In many TU-games the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) is hard or
even impossible to compute, but for the class of compromise stable games, Quant et al.
(2005) provide a closed formula for the nucleolus. Moreover, the class of compromise
stable games contains several interesting classes of games such as clan games (Potters et
al. (1989)), big boss games (Muto et al. (1989)), 1-convex games (Driessen(1988)) and
bankruptcy games (Curiel et al. (1988)). In fact, the class of bankruptcy games is the
intersection between the classes of convex and compromise stable games. This means
that any game that is both convex and compromise stable is strategically equivalent
to a bankruptcy game.
This paper is in the spirit of Van Velzen et al. (2002, 2004). We study sets of larginal
vectors that characterize compromise stability. A set of larginal vectors characterizes
compromise stability if it satises the condition that a game is compromise stable
whenever all larginal vectors of this set are core elements. To do so, we follow two
dierent approaches.
2First, we use the same neighbor argument as Van Velzen et al. (2002) to provide
an upper bound for the cardinality of characterizing sets.
Second, by using combinatorial arguments and results on matching in bipartite
graphs, we are able to identify the minimum cardinality of characterizing sets and
construct a procedure for nding such sets. Furthermore, we show that the set of all
orders can be partitioned into disjoint characterizing sets of minimum cardinality.
While the results in this paper are similar to those of van Velzen et al. (2002,
2004), the dierence in the structure of the larginal and the marginal vectors proves to
signicantly change the reasoning in the proofs. In the rst part of the paper, the proofs
dier due to the dierences between marginal and larginal vectors while the results
turn out to be the same. In the second part of the paper, the dierent structure of the
vectors leads to a new approach based on the combination of a combinatorial and graph
theoretical argument. It leads also to dierent results on the minimum cardinality of
characterizing sets, and we nd the minimum cardinality of characterizing sets to be
lower for compromise stability than for convexity.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some notation. Section 3
contains the main body of the paper where we start by using the neighbor argument
to compute an upper bound on the cardinality of characterizing sets in section 3.1,
while the minimum cardinality of characterizing sets is derived in section 3.2. Section
4 describes the partition of the orders into disjoint characterizing sets of minimum
cardinality.
2 Preliminaries
A transferable utility game (TU-game) is a pair (N;v), where N = f1;:::;ng, the
grand coalition, is a nite set of players and v : 2N ! R is a function that assigns to
every coalition S  N a worth v(S), with v(;) = 0. We often refer to a game as v
rather than (N;v) when no confusion can arise. The set of transferable utility games
with player set N is denoted by TUN.
For k 2 f1;:::;ng, Sk denotes the set of all coalitions with cardinality k, i.e.,
Sk = fS 2 2Nj jSj = kg.
Let N be a nite set of players. An order is a bijective function  : f1;:::;jNjg ! N.
The set of all orders is denoted (N), and (h) denotes the player at position h in the
order . An order h denotes the h'th neighbor of  which is obtained by switching
players at positions h and (h+1) in . Thus, h = ((1) ::: (h 1) (h+1) (h) (h+2)
::: (n)). As an example let N = f1;2;3;4g. If  = (1234) we get 1 = (2134),
2 = (1324), and 3 = (1243).
Let the identity order e be the order such that e(i) = i for all i 2 N. Then an even
order is an order that can be obtained from e by switching positions of neighboring
players an even number of times. An order that is not even is called odd. The neighbor
3of an odd order is even and vice versa.
Let  2 (N) be an order and let k 2 f1;:::;ng. Then the k-head of  refers to
the rst k positions of  and the k-tail of  refer to the last k positions of . Further,
denote the set of players belonging to the k-head of  by H
k = f(1);:::;(k)g, hence
H
l  H
k if l  k. Likewise, T 
k = f(n   k + 1);:::;(n)g denotes the set of players
belonging to the k-tail of , and T 
l  T 
k if l  k.
The core of a game v is dened by







xi  v(S) for all S  Ng
and describes the set of ecient allocation vectors such that no coalition has an incen-
tive to split o from the grand coalition. The core of a game may be empty.
The utopia demand of player i 2 N is given by
Mi(v) = v(N)   v(Nnfig)
and describes the maximum amount player i can achieve from cooperation, since the
coalition consisting of the rest of the players will never settle for less than v(Nnfig).
Player i can gather a coalition by promising the rest of the players in the coalition
their utopia demand. The maximum amount i can obtain in this way from some







The core cover of a game v equals




xi = v(N);m(v)  x  M(v)g
and thus gives the set of all ecient allocation vectors such that players receive at least
their minimum right but no more than their utopia demand. Observe that the core is
always a subset of the core cover (cf. Tijs and Lipperts (1982)). A game v 2 TUN is said
to be compromise admissible if m(v)  M(v) and
P
i2N mi(v)  v(N) 
P
i2N Mi(v),
that is, if the core cover is non-empty. The class of compromise admissible games with
player set N is denoted CAN:
The core cover equals the convex hull of the larginal vectors of a game v 2 CAN.






















4for each k 2 f1;:::;ng. For each order  2 (N) the larginal vector l(v) is the ecient
payo vector that assigns the utopia demand to the rst players in  as long as it is
still possible to give the remaining players their minimum rights. The rst player that
does not receive his utopia demand is called the pivot player. A larginal l(v) is called
even (odd) if the corresponding order  is even (odd). Furthermore, lh(v) is said to
be a neighbor of l(v), whenever h is a neighbor of .
The following theorem is a straightforward consequence of the results of Quant et
al. (2005).
Theorem 2.1. Let v 2 CAN. Then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) v is compromise stable,
(ii) C(v) = CC(v),
(iii) C(v) = convfl(v)j 2 (N)g,






for all S  N:
3 Characterizing compromise stable games using
larginal vectors
In this section, we describe specic sets of larginals satisfying the condition that a
game is compromise stable whenever all larginals of the set are core elements. While
this is known to be true for the full set of larginals (see Theorem 2.1) we can use the
specic structure of the larginal vectors to identify much smaller sets of larginals that
characterize compromise stability. We will describe such specic sets of larginals using
two dierent approaches. First, we use a neighbor argument to show that smaller sets
characterizing compromise stability can be found. Next, we combine combinatorial ar-
guments and graph theoretical results, in particular a matching argument, to construct
characterizing sets of minimum cardinality.
3.1 The neighbor argument
As a rst approach, we consider the neighbor argument of Van Velzen et al. (2002) and
show that this argument can also be applied in the context of compromise stable games
despite the dierences between the marginal and larginal vectors. Thus, we show that
if two consecutive neighbors of a larginal are in the core, then the larginal itself belongs
to the core. This result in turn implies that if all even larginals or all odd larginals are
in the core, then the game is compromise stable. While the results in the two cases
are parallel, the argumentation in the proofs depends on the structure of the marginal
and larginal vectors and therefore diers.
5Lemma 3.1. Let v 2 CAN, n  3, and  2 (N). Suppose there is an h 2 f1;:::;n 2g
such that lh(v);lh+1(v) 2 C(v). Then l(v) 2 C(v).
Proof. Since l(v) is by denition ecient, we only have to show that
P
i2S l
i (v)  v(S)
for all S  N. We distinguish between three cases depending on the position of the
pivot player.














i (v)  v(S)
for all S  N, where the inequality holds since lh+1(v) 2 C(v).
Case 2. The pivot player in l(v) is at position j 2 fh + 2;:::;ng. It follows that
l
i (v) = l
h










i (v)  v(S)
for all S  N, where the inequality holds since lh(v) 2 C(v).
Case 3. The pivot player in l(v) is at position h + 1. Here, we distinguish between
two cases depending on whether the pivot player (h + 1) belongs to S or not.
Case 3a. (h+1) 2 S. Since (h+1) is the pivot player it follows from the denition











i (v) = l
h+1














i (v)  v(S);
where the rst inequality is an equality if (h + 2) 2 S.




i (v) = l
h
i (v) for every










i (v)  v(S):
Combining all three cases yields l(v) 2 C(v).
6The above lemma states that if two consecutive neighbors of a larginal vector are
in the core so is the larginal vector itself. This implies in particular that if all odd or
all even larginals of a game belong to the core, then all larginals belong to the core, so
the following theorem is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. Let v 2 TUN, n  3. Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. v is compromise stable,
2. l(v) 2 C(v) for all odd  2 (N),
3. l(v) 2 C(v) for all even  2 (N).
This result is analogous to that of Rafels and Ybern (1995) for convex games.
In fact, we can use Lemma 3.1 to nd smaller sets that imply compromise stability
whenever all the larginals of the set are in the core.
If A  (N) is a set of orders such that the corresponding larginals belong to
the core, then this set can be expanded by applying Lemma 3.1 and adding to the
set any order that has two consecutive neighbors in A. Consequently, all larginals
corresponding to the orders of this new set are core elements. By repeatedly applying
this neighbor argument, we ultimately arrive at a set that can not be expanded further.
If this resulting set is equal to (N) then the original set A is said to be neighbor-
complete or n-complete. This indicates that if in some game all larginals corresponding
to the orders of an n-complete set are core elements, then all larginals of the game are
core elements, and hence, the game is compromise stable.
Example 3.1. Let N = f1;2;3;4g and consider the set of orders A = f(1234);(1342);
(1423);(2314);(2431);(2413);(3124);(3241);(3412);(4132);(4213);(4231)g consisting of
both odd and even orders. Then A is an n-complete set. Indeed, let A0 arise from
A by adding to the set all orders with two consecutive neighbors in A, i.e. A0 =
A [ f(1243);(1324);(1432);(2134);(2341);(3143);(3214);(3421);(4123);(4312)g. Ob-
serve that A0 6= (N). Next, A00 is obtained from A0 by adding to the set all orders
with two consecutive neighbors in A0, i.e. A00 = (N). On the other hand, consider the
set B = (N)nf(2143);(2413)g and note that B is not an n-complete set. Since (2143)
is the 2nd neighbor of (2413), and vice versa, none of the two can have two consecutive
neighbors in B. Therefore, B cannot be expanded to (N) by applying the neighbor
argument, and it is not an n-complete set. 4
In general, the sets of all odd or all even orders, as well as any set containing all odd
(or all even) orders, are examples of n-complete sets. Van Velzen et al. (2002) derive
upper and lower bounds for the minimum cardinality of n-complete sets. These results
are based on the properties of orders and the neighbor argument alone, and they can
therefore be directly applied to our setting. This is true since Lemma 3.1 of this paper
7is identical to Lemma 1 (pp.325) of Van Velzen et al. (2002), except that the rst is
stated with respect to larginal vectors and the latter with respect to marginal vectors.
For a game with n players let Qn = minfjAj : A  (N) is n-completeg denote
the minimum cardinality of an n-complete set. Van Velzen et al. (2002) show that the
lower bound for Qn is: n! 1
2
n 2
2 if n is even and n! 1
2
n 1
2 if n is odd. Table 1 summarizes
the results for n = 3;:::;9. Two numbers in brackets represent a lower and upper
bound respectively. Due to Lemma 3.1 the results from the table below carry over to
the present setting.
n 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
n! 6 24 120 720 5040 40320 362880
Qn 3 12 30 180 [630,1260] 5040 [22680,45360]
Table 1: Minimum cardinality of n-complete sets.
In the following section, we no longer make use of the neighbor argument but take
a dierent approach that enables us to nd characterizing sets of minimum cardinality.
3.2 The cardinality of minimum characterizing sets
In this subsection we present a necessary and sucient condition for a set of orders to
characterize compromise stability. Based on this condition, we develop a procedure for
constructing sets of minimum cardinality that characterize compromise stability.
We start by introducing the notion of compromise-complete (or c-complete) sets. A
set A  (N) is called c-complete if every game (N;v) 2 CAN for which l(v) 2 C(v)
for every  2 A is compromise stable. In the preceding section several examples of
c-complete sets were encountered. The full set of orders (N) is a c-complete set, and
Theorem 3.1 shows that the sets of all odd and all even orders are c-complete sets.
In fact, all n-complete sets are also c-complete. The rest of this section explores the
structure and minimum cardinality of c-complete sets.
First, we introduce a necessary and sucient condition for a set A  (N) to
be c-complete. Let P(NnS;S) denote the set of orders that begins with the players
of NnS and ends with the players of S, i.e.,  2 P(NnS;S) if (i) 2 S for all i 2
fn   jSj + 1;:::;ng.
Lemma 3.2. A set A  (N) is c-complete if and only if
A \ P(NnS;S) 6= ; for all S  N with 1 < jSj < n   1: (3.1)
Proof. First we prove the `if' part. Let A  N be such that (3.1) holds and let
(N;v) 2 CAN. Assume that l(v) 2 C(v) for all  2 A. We will show that A is
8c-complete by showing that (N;v) is compromise stable. To do so, it is sucient to
show that the inequality in Theorem 2.1 (iv) is satised for all S. Observe that if
S = N;S = Nnfig or S = fig with i 2 N, then this inequality is satised.
Let S 2 2N with 1 < jSj < n   1. Take  2 A \ P(NnS;S). Considering the
corresponding larginal, l(v), we distinguish between two cases.
















where the inequality holds since l(v) 2 C(v).
Case 2. The pivot player of l(v) is in S. This implies l
















where the inequality follows since l
i (v) 2 C(v).















We conclude that v is compromise stable, and therefore, A is c-complete.
Second, we prove the `only if' part. We show that A is not c-complete if (3.1) is
not satised by providing a game such that all larginals corresponding to orders in A
are core elements while the game is not compromise stable.
Assume that A does not fulll (3.1). Then there exists a coalition S  N;1 <





1 if T = S;
0 if jTj  jSj;T 6= S;
jTj   jSj if jTj > jSj:
(3.4)
Note, that the utopia demand and minimum right will be Mi(v) = 1 and mi(v) = 0





1 for all h 2 f1;:::;n   jSjg
0 for all h 2 fn   jSj + 1;:::;ng: (3.5)
First, we show that l(v) 2 C(v) for all  2 A.





i (v)  v(T) (3.6)
for all T 2 2Nnf;;Ng. Let T 2 2Nnf;;Ng.
If jTj  jSj;T 6= S then v(T) = 0 and since l
i (v)  0 for all i 2 N, (3.6) follows
immediately.
If T = S, then v(T) = 1 and since  = 2 P(NnS;S) at least one player in T is at
position h, with h 2 f1;:::;n   jSjg, and again (3.6) holds.
If jTj > jSj, then v(T) = jTj jSj, and by (3.5), (3.6) holds. Hence, l(v) 2 C(v).





i (v) = 0 < v(S
) = 1;
hence l(v) = 2 C(v) and v is not compromise stable. Thus A is not c-complete.
According to Lemma 3.2, a set A of orders can only be c-complete if for each S  N
with 1 < jSj < n 1 there exists an order  2 A such that T 
jSj = S. As an illustration,
we consider the following example.
Example 3.2. Let N = f1;2;3;4g. An example of a c-complete set is
A = f1234;1324;1423;2314;2413;3412g since every coalition of size 2 is contained in
the 2-tail of some order in A. Thus, A is c-complete, according to (3.1). However,
much larger sets of orders may not be c-complete. Consider for example the set B =
(N) n f3412;3421;4312;4321g. This set contains 20 orders, but it cannot be a c-
complete set, since the coalition f1;2g is not contained in the 2-tail of any order in B.
4
The above example illustrates that even large sets of orders with corresponding
larginals in the core may not be c-complete. An upper bound on the cardinality of sets
that are not c-complete is given in the proposition below.
Proposition 3.1. Let A  (N) be a set of orders with jAj > n!   dn
2e!(n   dn
2e)!.
Then A is c-complete.
Proof. For any set of players S 2 Sk we have jP(NnS;S)j = (n   k)!k! , i.e., there
exist (n   k)!k! dierent orders  2 (N) such that S = T 
k . Since jP(NnS;S)j 
dn
2e!(n   dn
2e)! for any S  N, it holds that A \ P(NnS;S) 6= ; for all S  N. Thus,
A is c-complete.
Proposition 3.1 gives an upper bound for the cardinality of a c-complete set. Next,
we focus on the minimum cardinality of a c-complete set of larginals, which is dened
as follows:
Ln = minfjAj : A  (N) is c-completeg:









In order to determine the minimum cardinality Ln, we identify the smallest possible
set of orders A, such that A\P(NnS;S) 6= ; for all S  N. A c-complete set can easily







. However, instead of picking for each S a new order where S is contained
in the tail, we can make use of the fact that the k-tail of any order  2 A also contains
sets of smaller sizes. The nal part of this section is devoted to nding the minimum
cardinality of c-complete sets and a procedure for creating c-complete sets of minimum
cardinality. Before we proceed, some intermediate observations are stated. The proofs
are trivial and omitted.
The rst lemma states that given an order  2 (N) rearranging entries within the
k-tail of  will not aect the set of players in the k-tail.
Lemma 3.3. Let k 2 f1;:::;n 1g and let ; 2 (N) be orders such that (i) = (i)
for all i 2 f1;:::;n   kg. Then T 
k = T 
k .
The second lemma states the observation that whenever every subset of size k is
contained in the k-tail of some order in a set A  (N) then every subset of size n k
will be contained in the (n   k)-head of some order in A and vice versa.
Lemma 3.4. Let A  (N) be a set of orders and let k 2 f1;:::;n   1g. For each
S 2 Sk there exists a  2 A such that T 
k = S if and only if for each S0 2 Sn k there
exists a  2 A such that H
n k = S0.
Observe that if A satises condition (3.1), this is equivalent to saying that for each
k 2 f2;:::;n   2g and for each S 2 Sk there exists a  2 A such that T 
k = S. Then,
according to Lemma 3.4 there exists also for each k 2 f2;:::;n   2g and for each
S 2 Sk a  2 A such that H
k = S.
The following example illustrates lemma 3.4.
Example 3.3. Let N = f1;2;3;4;5g. Then jS3j = 10. For each S 2 S3 choose a
 such that T 
3 = S. Ten such orders are listed below. A vertical line separates the
2-heads from the 3-tails.
45j123 35j124 34j125 25j134 24j135
23j145 15j234 14j235 13j245 12j345
Observe that for each S 2 S3 there exists a  such that T 
3 = S and for each S 2 S2
there exists a  such that H
2 = S. 4
11Next, we describe a procedure for generating c-complete sets. The key element of
this procedure is an iterative step starting from a set of orders where every subset of
size k is contained in a k-tail. By rearranging the entries within the k-tails, a new set
of orders is created where besides every subset of size k is contained in a k-tail, also
every subset of size k   1 is contained in the (k   1)-tail of some order in this set.
We determine the right positions of the players in the tails by describing the problem
of rearranging tails as a matching problem. We construct suitable bipartite graphs
representing the problem and change the orders according to maximum matchings in
these specic graphs. Before we formally introduce the procedure, we provide some
notation and results from graph theory.
A graph G is a pair (V;E) where V is a non-empty, nite set of vertices and E is
a set of pairs of vertices called edges. For an edge fa;bg the vertices a;b are said to be
the endpoints of the edge. The edge fa;bg is said to be incident to each of the vertices
a and b, and the two vertices are said to be adjacent. The degree of a vertex w is equal
to the number of edges incident to w. The maximum degree, (G), of a graph equals
the largest degree of a vertex in the graph.
A bipartite graph G(V1;V2;E) is a graph with vertex set V = V1 [ V2, V1 \ V2 = ;
such that every edge in E has one endpoint in V1 and one in V2. A bipartite graph
is said to be k-regular if the degree of all vertices in V equals k, and it is said to be
(k;l)-semiregular if the degree of all vertices in V1 and V2 is k and l respectively.
A subset M of E is called a matching in G if no edges in M are incident to the
same vertex. A vertex w is said to be covered under M if there is an edge in M that
is incident to w.
Consider a set of orders, A, where for any S 2 Sk there exists an order  such that
T 
k = S. We now show that it is always possible to modify the k-tails of the orders in
A to obtain a new set A0 where besides for any S 2 Sk there exists an order  2 A0
such that T 
k = S also for every S 2 Sk 1 there exists an order 0 2 A0 such that
T 0
k 1 = S. To do so, we rst create a graph in which each coalition of size k and k   1
is represented by a unique node.
For some n  3 and k  dn
2e, let G(V1;V2;E) be a graph with vertex set V = V1[V2,




and dene the map Sk : V1 ! Sk that assign to each vertex of




and dene the map Sk 1 : V2 ! Sk 1
that assigns to each vertex of V2 a dierent coalition of size k 1. Let w1 2 V1, w2 2 V2
be adjacent if and only if Sk 1(w2)  Sk(w1). Then two nodes within V1 (or V2) will
never be adjacent and G(V1;V2;E) is thus a bipartite graph. Further, every vertex
in V1 has degree k, while every vertex in V2 has degree n   k + 1. Hence, G is a
(k;n   k + 1)-semiregular graph. Observe that n   k + 1  k.
Example 3.4. Let N = f1;2;3;4;5g. If k = 3, we have jV1j = jV2j = 10, and each
vertex in V has degree 3, see Figure 1. If we consider instead the graph for k = 2, we
see that jV1j = 10 > 5 = jV2j, and every vertex in V1 has degree 2 while every vertex
in V2 has degree 4, see Figure 2.
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Figure 1: G(V1;V2;E) for n = 5, k = 3.
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Figure 2: G(V1;V2;E) for n = 5, k = 2.
4
In the graph G(V1;V2;E), a matching covering every node in V2 can be used as a
basis for rearranging the k-tails of a set of orders that contains all coalitions of Sk such
that every subset of size k   1 is contained in one of the (k   1)-tails of the set. The
existence of such a matching is straightforward (cf. Berge (1973)).
Next, it is shown how such a matching can be used to determine a proper way of
arranging the players within the tails.
Lemma 3.5. Let k 2 f1;:::;dn




, be a set of orders such
that for every S 2 Sk there exists a  2 A1 with T 
k = S. Then there exists a set of
orders A2 that satises the following three properties:
(i) for every  in A1 there exists a  2 A2 such that (h) = (h)
for all h 2 f1;:::;n   kg,
13(ii) for all S 2 Sk 1 there exists a  2 A2 such that T 
k 1 = S,
(iii) jA1j = jA2j.
Proof. Consider the graph G(V1;V2;E). Let M be a matching covering V2 in
G(V1;V2;E). Let fw1;w2g be an edge in M such that w1 2 V1 and w2 2 V1. Take
 2 A1 such that T 
k = Sk(w1). Consider Sk 1(w2). If T 
k 1 = Sk 1(w2), then dene
 = . Otherwise, there exists a j such that (j) = Sk(w1)nSk 1(w2). Now dene 
as follows:
(h) = (h) if h 2 f1;:::;n   kg [ fj + 1;:::;ng;
(h) = (j) if h = n   k + 1;
(h) = (h   1) if h 2 fn   k + 2;:::;jg:
Let A2 be the set that arises by changing each  2 A1 as above. Then A2 satises
properties (i), (ii) and (iii).
Note that Lemma 3.5 can also be stated in terms of heads instead of tails and
similarly proven. The following example illustrates Lemma 3.5.
Example 3.5. Let N = f1;2;3;4;5g and consider the following set of orders A1 in
which the 3-tails contain every subset of size 3.
45j123 35j124 34j125 25j134 24j135
23j145 15j234 14j235 13j245 12j345
We want to ensure that every 2-player coalition is contained in at least one 2-tail of
the ten orders. This is currently not the case since none of the sets f1;2g;f1;3g;f1;4g
or f1;5g are contained in any 2-tail. To solve this, consider the graph in Figure 1 and
identify a matching covering V2. The matching M illustrated in Figure 3 is such a
matching. Next, we will transform the set A1 into the new set of orders A2 in which
t t t t t t t t t t
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Figure 3: A maximum matching M in G(V1;V2;E) for n = 5, k = 3.
the 2-tails and 3-tails contain every subset of size 2 and 3, respectively. For example,
14the order  = (45123) 2 A denes an edge that connects the sets S3(w1) = f1;2;3g
and S2(w2) = f2;3g. Since T 2 = f2;3g = S2(w2), we dene the  equal to .
On the other hand, the  = (24135) 2 A denes an edge that connects the sets
S3(w1) = f1;3;5g and S2(w2) = f1;5g. Since T 2 = f3;5g 6= S2(w2) we dene  by
(1) = (1);(2) = (2);(3) = (4);(4) = (3) and (5) = (5). By applying this
procedure to each  2 A1, we obtain the set A2:
45j123 35j124 34j512 25j413 24j315
23j514 15j234 14j235 13j425 12j345
Notice that A2 is c-complete, according to Lemma 3.2, since n = 5 and the tails of the
set of orders contain every coalition of size 2 and 3. 4
Note that for k < dn
2e, a (maximum) matching covering V2 will leave some nodes








for k < dn
2e.
We are now ready to state the main results.






Proof. Let n  3 and k = dn






be constructed for any n  3.





, be a set of orders that satises (3.1) for all S 2 Sd n
2 e.
Then there exists for every S 2 Sd n
2 e a  2 A1 such that T 
d n
2 e = S .
From Lemma 3.5 we can construct a set of orders A2  (N);jA2j = jA1j, such that
there exists for any S 2 Sd n
2 e 1 a  2 A2 with T 
d n
2 e 1 = S. Since Lemma 3.5 holds for
any k, we may iteratively apply this argument. This will, after j iterations, result in a
set of orders A1+j such that jA1+jj = jA1j and such that for any k 2 fdn
2e j;:::;dn
2eg
and any S 2 Sk there exists a  2 A1+j with T 
k = S. Thus, after dn
2e 2 iterations we
have constructed the set Ad n
2 e 1 where for each S 2 Sk and any k 2 f2;:::;dn
2eg there
exists a  2 Ad n
2 e 1 with T 
k = S.
Since Lemma 3.5 can also be stated in terms of heads, we may apply a similar
argument to Ad n
2 e 1 to iteratively construct new sets by changing the heads of orders.
After bn
2c   2 iterations this will result in a set A such that for each S 2 Sk with
k 2 f2;:::;bn
2cg there exists a  2 A with H
k = S.
Then, by Lemma 3.4 there exists for any S 2 Sk with k 2 fn bn
2c;:::;n 2g a  2
A such that T 
k = S. Since there already exists for any S 2 Sk with k 2 f2;:::;dn
2eg
a  2 A such that T 
k = S, A is c-complete by Lemma 3.2.






n  3. The following corollary is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 3.2 and
(3.7).






15From Van Velzen et al. (2004), the minimum cardinality of sets characterizing con-
vexity is Mn = n!
2( n 3
2 )!( n 1
2 )! for odd n and Mn = n!
2( n 2
2 )!( n 2
2 )! for even n. A comparison
of the minimum cardinality of complete sets for the cases of compromise stability and
convexity is given in Table 2, for n = 3;:::;9. It shows that Ln < Mn for any n > 3. In
fact, the relative size of the minimum cardinalities can be calculated as Ln=Mn = 8
n2 1
for odd n and Ln=Mn = 8
n2 for even n .
n 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
n! 6 24 120 720 5040 40320 362880
Mn 3 12 30 90 210 560 1260
Ln 3 6 10 20 35 70 126
Table 2: Summary of results.
4 Partitioning the set of orders






for any n  3. It is easily observable that for e.g. n = 3 it is possible to partition the
full set of orders, (N), into disjoint c-complete sets of minimum cardinality, namely
the two sets consisting of the odd and even orders, respectively. In this section we show












= (n   dn
2e)!dn
2e! minimum c-complete sets.
We use the procedure from Theorem 3.2 along with properties of the bipartite
graphs from the previous section to create the partition.
Let n  3 and k  dn
2e. Let G(V1;V2;E) be the (k;n   k + 1)-regular bipartite
graph, as dened in the previous section, in which V1 and V2 represent all coalitions
of size k and k   1, respectively. The Integer Flow Theorem immediately implies
that there exists k disjoint maximum matchings of G, say E1;E2;:::;Ek. Hence, each
matching covers V2 completely. Now, dene the following k edge-disjoint bipartite
graphs Gi = (V1;V2;Ei [ E
i ), i 2 f1;:::;kg, where E
1;E
2;:::;E
k is a partition of the












for all j 2 f1;2;:::;kg, and the degree of each vertex of V1 in G is equal to one. We
illustrate this partition in the following example.
Example 4.1. Let N = f1;2;3;4;5g and let k = 2. Then the corresponding (2,4)-
regular bipartite graph G = (V1;V2;E) is displayed in Figure 4. Figure 5 represents
the edge-disjoint partition G1;G2 in which the bold edges correspond to the maximum
matchings.
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Figure 4: G(V1;V2;E) for n = 5, k = 2.
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Figure 5: An edge-partitioning G1, G2 of G.
4
Since the above described partition is based on disjoint matchings, the following
Lemma is a straightforward generalization of Lemma 3.5. The proof is similar to the
proof of Lemma 3.5, and therefore it is omitted.
17Lemma 4.1. Let n  3 and k 2 f1;:::;dn
2eg, and let A be a set of orders such that
for any S 2 Sk there exists a  2 A with T 
k = S. Then we can construct k disjoint
sets A1;:::;Ak  N, such that for each j 2 f1;:::;kg it holds that:
(i) for each  in A, there exists a  2 Aj such that (h) = (h)
for all h 2 f1;:::;n   kg,
(ii) for every S 2 Sk 1, there exists a  2 Aj such that T 
k 1 = S
(iii) jAjj = jAj.
Note, that also this lemma can be stated in terms of heads as well as tails.
The following theorem is a straightforward result of Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 4.1. For any n  3 the set of orders (N) can be partitioned into
dn
2e!(n   dn






In the nal example we provide a partition of the orders if N = f1;2;3;4;5g.
Example 4.2. Table 3 provides a partition of the set of orders of (N), with N =
f1;2;3;4;5g where every row corresponds to a c-complete set. Observe, that it is not
a unique partition, because the collection of the disjoint maximum matchings is not
unique.
54j132 35j142 43j521 25j413 42j315 32j514 15j243 14j235 13j425 21j354
54j123 35j124 43j512 25j431 42j351 32j 541 15j234 14j253 13j452 21j345
54j321 35j214 43j125 25j143 42j513 32j415 15j342 14j532 13j254 21j435
54j312 35j241 43j125 25j134 42j531 32j451 15j324 14j523 13j245 21j453
54j213 35j421 43j215 25j314 42j135 32j154 15j432 14j325 13j542 21j543
54j231 35j412 43j251 25j341 42j153 32j145 15j423 14j352 13j524 21j534
45j132 53j142 34j521 52j413 24j315 23j514 51j243 41j235 31j425 12j354
45j123 53j124 34j512 52j431 24j351 23j 541 51j234 41j253 31j452 12j345
45j321 53j214 34j125 52j143 24j513 23j415 51j342 41j532 31j254 12j435
45j312 53j241 34j125 52j134 24j531 23j451 51j324 41j523 31j245 12j453
45j213 53j421 34j215 52j314 24j135 23j154 51j432 41j325 31j542 12j543
45j231 53j412 34j251 52j341 24j153 23j145 51j423 41j352 31j524 12j534
Table 3: Twelve disjoint c-complete sets of minimum cardinality for n = 5.
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